Continuing the previous three postings here is the last set of 5 more "Things politicians need to know about shale gas science", inspired by the recent Guardian article entitled "Top 20 things politicians need to know about science" from an original article in Nature.
It is not just politicians that need to know this stuff - without it the
whole debate is not possible.
16. Data can be dredged or cherry
picked
Evidence can be arranged to support
one point of view.
Shale gas is a subject which stirs
strong passions and in which opinions are extremely polarised. I would say that
more than 95% of public commentators hold a strong view on shale gas, yet the
majority of the general public would like clear unbiased, evidence-based
information upon which they can make their minds up.
Everyone should realise that Nature
is unbiased. If we make certain decisions Nature will give us the unbiased
consequences, whether good or bad. We have, therefore, a duty to be unbiased too.
This disconnection between the
sources of advice and those who need it is worrying. The few who try to give
balanced and factual information are constantly being badgered by both sides to
accept views which are not based on tested or testable reality. In this way
sources of independent advice are eroded and silenced.
One should realise that industry will
not lie to you, at least UK-based industry will not. It is not in their
interest to do so, and existing local, national and European regulations are
such that there are huge penalties for getting it wrong, in the courts of
justice and in the courts of public opinion.
Industry, will, however, put the best
possible spin on what they are doing. In the past most of what they did was
kept secret; not so much in order to keep the general public in the dark, but
because most information is commercially sensitive in a competitive business
market. Now, in the UK at least, there is a move towards being more
transparent, such that the general public knows more of the information which
the companies are using to make their own decisions. An example of this is the
before and
after water
and air quality analyses that Cuadrilla carried out at Balcombe, which are
freely available.
Individuals who are against shale gas
do not lie either, but they also commonly choose results which and support
their preconceptions. For example, there
are very real worries concerning the environmental damage that mining and
processing of rare earth elements in China is causing. Some of these rare earth elements, such as
neodymium, are necessary to make the magnets that wind turbines use, and the
by-products of mining and processing are toxic and radioactive. Yet search for neodymium on the Greenpeace or
Friends of the Earth web sites and you will not find it. Rare earth element pollution is not
consistent with the message that these organisations want to convey. Since the pollution happens in rural China,
it is simply ignored. As lobbying
groups, these organisations are simply controlling what is made public, and
therefore behaving exactly like industry.
Studies have shown
that the conscious or subconscious choice of results to fulfil preconceptions is
a very human trait, and extremely difficult to guard against no matter how
mindful the individual is.
George Bernard Shaw once said
“The moment we want to believe something, we
suddenly see all the arguments for it, and become blind to the arguments
against it.
Scientists are trained to keep an open and unbiased mind, but even they have a duty to be constantly mindful of what the evidence says, and not to interpret the evidence beyond its limits. One of the best tests of such a commentator is to ask whether all of the evidence supports his or her main point.
The authors of the article “
Top 20 things politicians need to know about science” concern themselves with the needing to know whether the authors set out to test a sole hypothesis, or happening across a finding in a huge data set. Data that one happens across when not looking for it can be extremely good, useful and relevant. However, often it is not applicable to the argument because it applies to a different group/location/problem/population etc., or was obtained using inapplicable assumptions or using different premises.
The question one should ask is whether the study was designed to answer the particular question it is being used on, and if not whether there are differences that make its use inapplicable.
17. Extreme measurements may mislead
Any set of data (concentrations of
methane in ground-water, say) will show
- natural variation between locations (due to different
geological histories),
- plus sampling (sampling may be atypical because
it is done in areas where problems are suspected),
- plus bias (the concentration of methane may
depend on some other unknown factor),
- plus measurement errors (different testers using
different methodologies in different locations, or simply using erroneous
methods, inaccurate tools or uncalibrated tools).
However, the resulting variation is
typically interpreted only with respect to the distance to the nearest well,
ignoring the other sources.
Difference, even extreme ones, may be due to a
combination of other factors than that in which you are interested.
18. Study relevance limits
generalisations
The relevance of a study depends on
how much the conditions under which it is done resemble the conditions of the
issue under consideration.
For example, there are limits to the generalisations
that one can make from US data when trying to predict the effect in the UK or
Europe.
19. Feelings influence risk
perception
Broadly, risk can be thought of as
the likelihood of an event occurring in some time frame, multiplied by the
consequences should the event occur. People’s risk perception is influenced
disproportionately by many things, including the rarity of the event, how much
control they believe they have, the adverseness of the outcomes, and whether
the risk is voluntarily or not.
According to
David Ropeik roughly 20% of Americans still do not wear safety belts in motor vehicles. The risk perception literature would suggest that this is, in part, because we have a sense of control when we are behind the wheel, and the risk of crashing is both familiar and chronic—factors that make risks seem less threatening. The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates that if safety belt usage increased from 80% to 85%, 2,700 lives would have been saved in 2002 (
National Center for Statistics & Analysis (2003) Traffic Safety Facts 2002: Occupant Protection. Washington, DC, USA: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 809 610).
Similarly, many people fail to protect themselves adequately from the sun, in part because the sun is natural and because, for some of us, the benefit of a healthy glowing tan outweighs the risks of solar exposure. However, solar radiation is widely believed to be the leading cause of melanoma, which will kill an estimated 7,910 Americans this year (
American Cancer Society (2004) Cancer Facts & Figures 2004. Atlanta, GA, USA: American Cancer Society).
Focussing on the negative aspects of
a development such as a shale gas pollution incident may raise fear despite the
extent, timescale and likelihood of the event being small, while ignoring the
risks of not carrying out the development, which would include financial and
social growth, provision of jobs, better health care etc.
Risk perception should be judged both
ways: the risk of doing and the risk of not doing!
20. Dependencies change the risks
It is possible to calculate the
consequences of individual events, such as an extreme storm, high tides and the
availability of key workers. However, if the events are interrelated then the
probability of a disaster is much higher than might be expected.
 |
| http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/11/06/super-typhoon-haiyan-hits-category-5-an-extremely-serious-threat-to-philippines/ |
This is exactly what happened recently
in the Philippines. The government was well prepared for storms because it gets
lots of them (together with earthquakes and volcanoes – who would want to live
there!?). It had dumps of emergency stuff distributed around the country. Yet a
combination of a large storm, an unexpectedly large storm surge and the death
or ineffectiveness of police and local government workers ensured that Typhoon
Haiyan was a dreadful disaster.
Most disasters that damage the
environment and take lives in Europe are due, in the last analysis, to more
than one factor, which exacerbate each other. That is the reason why all new
and unusual processes have to be considered extremely carefully. Shale gas
operations qualify for special care simply because we have not carried many of
them out in Europe.
